
































Abstract - Collective Identification Procedures (CIPs) model admission rules regulating membership in 
associations, communities and clubs: the Libertarian identification rule F
l is the CIP which essentially relies 
on self-certification. This paper studies F
l in an arbitrary finite atomistic lattice, allowing an unified treatment 
of collective identification problems with either exogenous or endogenous choice of classification labels. An 
elementary axiomatic characterization of F
l in that general setting is provided and contrasted with previously 
known characterizations which only work in more specialized (e.g. distributive) lattices, and are therefore 
confined to collective identification problems with exogenously fixed labels. Non-manipulability properties 
of F










Stefano Vannuccci, Dipartimento di Economia Politica, Università di Siena 1 Introduction
Collective identiﬁcation procedures (CIPs) model the admission rules that
are used in order to identify the legitimate members of certain formal or
informal associations, clubs, or communities, treating such rules as opinion-
aggregating functions. Given a certain population, each agent submits an
assessment of membership qualiﬁcations concerning the entire population,
and a CIP amalgamates the resulting proﬁle of assessments to establish who
is to be considered a member. In the last decade, following the lead of a sem-
inal paper by Kasher and Rubinstein (see Kasher and Rubinstein (1997))
some work has been devoted to the formal social-choice-theoretic study of
CIPs. The extant literature has been mostly focussed on classiﬁcations with
exogenously given labels ( and in fact, on binary labels, with ‘being a J(ew)’
-the original issue addressed by Kasher and Rubinstein- mostly acting as a
paradigmatic case: this version of the identiﬁcation problem will be denoted
here as the standard binary classiﬁcation problem). Here, we are interested
in the self-certiﬁcation-based ‘libertarian’ rule. In general terms, this rule
may described as follows: for any possible opinion proﬁle, the resulting asso-
ciative structure is the one engendered by those agents who self-certify their
qualiﬁcations to join it as members, namely the smallest associative structure
that includes all willing, self-certifying agents. The libertarian rule and its
characterizations have attracted much attention, playing a central role in the
literature as a prominent benchmark (see e.g. Samet and Schmeidler (2003),
Sung and Dimitrov (2005), Miller (2006), Houy (2007), and of course Kasher
and Rubinstein (1997)). Indeed, whenever population units are to be clas-
siﬁed according to a preﬁxed set of exhaustive explicit (intensional) labels,
either binary such as member/nonmember or not, the libertarian rule simply
states that each agent is classiﬁed under a certain label if and only if that
label is attached by that agent to itself. Put otherwise, under the libertarian
rule a) providing self-certiﬁcation ensures membership (positive eﬀectiveness
of self-certiﬁcation), while b) denying self-certiﬁcation prevents it (negative
eﬀectiveness of self-certiﬁcation). However, one might also want to consider
t h ec a s eo fafully endogenous self-classiﬁcation problem, where agents simul-
taneously decide memberships and the set of relevant (mutually incompatible)
classes, with corresponding implicit (extensional) labels1. Apparently, such
a case can be modelled as follows: each population unit (or rather each pair
1Hence, in this case labels are implicit and essentially determined by memberships
themselves, and their distribution. In a more formal vein, exogenous labelling denotes
1of population units) proposes a partition of the population, and a CIP ag-
gregates the resulting proﬁle of partitions to produce a ﬁnal partition: here,
the relevant labels are the blocks of the latter, i.e. their extensions. Un-
fortunately, it turns out that, as it is easily checked, no CIP for partitions
can ensure both positive and negative eﬀectiveness of self-certiﬁcation: if
two pairs A,B of population units think they should stay together and pair
C also wish to join them within the same block, but pair A agree while B
refuse, then there is no way to accommodate all the relevant self-certiﬁcatory
claims in the ﬁnal partition.
But then, does there exist any appropriate formulation of the libertarian
identiﬁcation rule which works for the standard binary and the fully endoge-
nous classiﬁcation problems?
This paper addresses this issue pursuing the analysis within the general
framework of an arbitrary atomistic lattice. In fact, an atomistic lattice is
by deﬁnition a lattice with a minimum whose elements are all composed (i.e.
joins) of atoms (an atom is an element ‘just’ greater than the minimum i.e.
greater than the minimum but with no elements in between). When -as in the
collective identiﬁcation setting- lattices model coalition structures, atomistic
lattices correspond to those coalition structures which can be reduced to some
basic nonnegligible agents (in fact, their ‘members’, or constitutive elements).
Now, the natural settings for the standard binary classiﬁcation problem
(for a ﬁnite population) and for the fully endogenous classiﬁcation are, re-
spectively, the (boolean) lattice of subsets of the (ﬁnite) set of population
units, and the lattice of partitions of the set of population units, which are
both atomistic lattices.
The libertarian CIP Fl in (ﬁnite) atomistic lattices is thus deﬁned, and
studied. A characterization of Flis provided and contrasted with previously
known characterizations of the libertarian CIP in the more specialized setting
of (ﬁnite, boolean) distributive lattices. Some basic manipulability and co-
operative stability properties of F l in simple environments with self-oriented
preferences are also discussed.
The present paper is organized as follows: Section 2 is devoted to a pre-
sentation of the model, and the results. Section 3 is devoted to a discussion of
strategy-proofness properties of the libertarian rule in simple environments.
use of a set of labels which is unrelated to population parameters, while on the contrary
endogenous labelling entails use of a set of admissible labels whose cardinality does depend
on population size.
2Section 4 includes a discussion of some related literature. Section 5 provides
some short comments on the main results of the paper.
2 Notation, model, and results
Let L =( L,6) be a ﬁnite lattice namely a ﬁnite partially ordered set2 such
that for any x,y ∈ L both the greatest lower bound x∧y and the least upper
bound x∨y of {x,y} do exist. For any A ⊆ L, ∧A and ∨A are deﬁn e di nt h e
obvious way by induction on cardinality of A. Clearly, L has also a minimum
0L = ∧L,a n dam a x i m u m1L = ∨L. A join irreducible element of L is any
j ∈ L such that j 6= ∧L and for any x,y ∈ L if j = x∨y then j ∈ {x,y}.T h e
set of all join irreducible elements of L is denoted JL: it is also assumed that
#JL ≥ 2 in order to avoid tedious qualiﬁcations or trivialities. An atom of
L is any j ∈ L which is an upper cover of 0L- written 0Llj- i.e. 0L <j and
l = j for any l ∈ L such that 0L <l6 j. The set of all atoms of L is denoted
AL.I ti se a s i l yc h e c k e dt h a ti ng e n e r a lAL ⊆ JL,w h i l et h ec o n v e r s em a yn o t
hold3. L is atomistic if and only AL = JL i.e. equivalently whenever each
element l ∈ L is the least upper bound of a set of atoms. An atomistic lattice
L may or may not be distributive i.e. such that a∧(b∨c)=( a∧b)∨(a∧c)
for any a,b,c ∈ L. This paper will be dealing with both distributive and
nondistributive atomistic lattices.
The suggested interpretation in the collettive identiﬁcation problem is
the following: L denote the set of all possible associative structures, and AL
the set of all their basic constitutive units, i.e. the set of relevant agents in
the collective identiﬁcation process under consideration. For any associative
structure a ∈ L,a n da t o mi ∈ AL , i 6 a denotes that i is a component of a.
ACollective Identiﬁcation Procedure (CIP) on AL is a function F : LAL →
L.I np a r t i c u l a r ,f o ra n yi,j ∈ AL, it will be said that j accepts/nominates
i at opinion proﬁle x =( x1,...,x#AL) whenever i 6 xj. At each opinion
proﬁle x, F(x) denotes the resulting associative structure, whose set of basic
components/atoms is given by A(F(x)) := {j ∈ AL : j 6 F(x)}.
For any pair F,F0 of CIPs on JL, it will be written F 0 5 F whenever
2Thus, by deﬁnition, L is a ﬁnite set, and 6 is a transitive, reﬂexive and antisymmetric
binary relation on L.
3To see this, just consider a ﬁnite totally ordered set i.e. a chain (L,6) with #L ≥ 3:
the only atom of (L,6) is the 6-minimum of L\{∧L},w h i l ea n yx ∈ L\{∧L} is a join-
irreducible element.
3F0(x) 6 F(x) for all x ∈ LJL i.e. when F is more inclusive than F0.
The two basic motivating examples of our model are the following distinct
and somewhat ‘polar’ versions of the collective identiﬁcation problem.
E x a m p l e1 : C o l l e c t i v ei d e n t i ﬁcation as collective binary self-
classiﬁcation with an exogenous label
That is the case the extant literature on collective identiﬁcation proce-
dures is typically focussed on: the legitimate members of a certain association
or group are to be determined. Each agent provides a positive or negative
assessment of all agents, and the resulting proﬁle of assessments determines
membership. Thus, the lattice is (P(N),⊆),w h e r eN is the (ﬁnite) popula-
tion of agents: it is both atomistic and distributive. Indeed, in that lattice
the atoms or agents are the singletons i.e. the population units themselves.
Thus the standard case with set of agents N reduces to a special instance of
our model with L = P(N), 6=⊆,a n dAL = JL ' N.
Example 2: Collective identiﬁcation as collective self-classiﬁcation
with implicit endogenous labels
In this case, population units form a partitional coalition structure i.e.
partition themselves into disjoint coalitions, or blocks. Labels as such are
clearly not important: they are implicitly deﬁned by blocks themselves, and
are therefore endogenously deﬁned by the resulting partition. Thus, if N
denotes the set of population units, the relevant lattice here is the lattice
(Π(N),v) of partitions of N,w h e r ev is the coarsening order deﬁned as
follows: for any π1,π2 ∈ Π(N), π1 v π2 iﬀ for any A ∈ π1,a n dh,k ∈
N,i f {h,k} ⊆ A then there exists B ∈ π2 such that {h,k} ⊆ B.T h i s
lattice is atomistic but nondistributive4: the atoms are those partitions πhk
of N consisting of singletons except for an unique two-unit block {h,k}.
Therefore, the relevant agents are pairs of distinct population units. Hence,
we have here another special instance of our model with L = Π(N), 6=v,
and AL = JL ' (N × N) \ ∆N (w h e r e∆N = {(i,i):i ∈ N}).
The Libertarian CIP Fl as deﬁn e do na na r b i t r a r yﬁnite atomistic lattice
establishes that the associative structure induced by an opinion proﬁle is the
4The partition lattice only satisﬁes upper semimodularity (a condition strictly weaker
than distributivity), namely for any a,b ∈ Π(N) if a is an upper cover of a ∧ b then a∨ b
is an upper cover of b.
4one engendered by those agents who self-certify their own qualiﬁcations -or
willingness- to join,n a m e l y
Deﬁnition 1 (The Libertarian CIP Fl): for any x ∈ LJL,
Fl(x)=∨{j ∈ JL : j 6 xj }
Hence, the libertarian rule identiﬁes as members precisely those agents
who are components of the smallest associative structure comprising as com-
ponents all those who declare themselves to qualify.I tm i g h ts e e mt h a tt h e
libertarian rule may also be described in a less cumbersome way saying it
identiﬁes as members all those agents who declare themselves to qualify.H o w -
ever, it turns out that those two descriptions are not equivalent whenever
the relevant lattice of associative structures is nondistributive: this is a key
observation which underlies all of the ensuing analysis.
In that connection, a basic property of (ﬁnite) distributive lattices is to
be recalled, namely
Fact: (see e.g. Grätzer (1998), Monjardet (1990)). Let L =( L0,6)
be a (ﬁnite) lattice, and J∗ the set of join-irreducible elements of (L0,6).
Then, i) if L is distributive, then for any x ∈ L0 t h e r ee x i s t sau n i q u e
J(x)={j1,...,jk} ⊆ J∗such that x = ∨J(x) and x<∨J0 for any J0 ⊂ J(x);
ii) L is distributive if and only if for any j ∈ J∗,a n da n yl1,...,l h ∈ L0,i f
j<l 1 ∨ ... ∨ lh then there exists i ∈ {1...,h} such that j 6 li.
Thus, if L is (atomistic and) distributive, for any CIP F : LAL → L,a n d
any x ∈ LAL, there exists a unique (minimal or irredundant) set {j1,...,jk} ⊆
AL such that F(x)=j1 ∨ ... ∨ jk (i.e. {j1,...,jk} is an irredundant join-
decomposition of F(x)). Hence {j1,...,jk} = A(F(x)) as deﬁned above,
and the identity F(x)=j1 ∨ ... ∨ jk m a yb et a k e nt od e n o t ewithout any
ambiguity that CIP F at opinion proﬁle x identiﬁes agents j1,...,j k as
the only legitimate members constituting the associative structure under con-
sideration. If, however, L is nondistributive then neither i) nor ii) above
hold. Failure of i) entails that there may exist several distinct irredundant
join-decompositions of some l ∈ L. Hence, in particular it may the case
that F(x)=j1 ∨ ... ∨ jk while {j1,...,jk} ⊂ A(F(x)), hence that there ex-
ist i ∈ A(F(x)), i/ ∈ {j1,...,jk} such that -by deﬁnition of atom- i ­ jh,
h =1 ,...,k(violating ii) as well).
5To check this, just consider the partition lattice (Π({1,2,3}),v),a n di t s
atoms π12, π13, π23.O fc o u r s e ,π12∨π23 = {{1,2,3}}, the coarsest partition.
Hence, of course, π13 @ π12∨π23,w h i l eb o t hnot π13 v π12 and not π13 v π23.
Concerning the libertarian CIP, the consequences of this simple fact are
momentous. Indeed, consider the following properties for a CIP F:
Negative Atomic Self-Determination (NASD) : For any x ∈ LJL
and any j ∈ AL,i fj ­ xj then j ­ F(x).
Positive Atomic Self-Determination (PASD) : For any x ∈ LJL and
any j ∈ AL,i fj 6 xj then j 6 F(x).
Clearly enough, NASD establishes that any agent can eﬀectively decline
participation in the relevant association, while PASD requires that, con-
versely, any willing agent may join it.
Now, it is easily shown that in the binary classiﬁcation problem the liber-
tarian CIP is the only one which satisﬁes both NASD and PASD, whereas in
the general classiﬁcation problem with endogenous labels NASD and PASD
are mutually inconsistent. Indeed, a much more general statement holds
true, namely
Claim 2 i) Let L =( L,6) be a ﬁnite distributive atomistic lattice. Then
Fl is the only CIP that satisﬁes both NASD and PASD; ii) let L =( L,6)
be a ﬁnite nondistributive atomistic lattice. Then no CIP F : LAL → L can
satisfy both NASD and PASD. In particular, Fl satisﬁes PASD but violates
NASD.
Proof. i) Let j ∈ AL,a n dx ∈ LAL such that j ­ xj and j 6 F l(x). Then,
by deﬁnition of F l,t h e r ee x i s tj1,...,jk ∈ AL such that jh 6 xh, h =1 ,...,k,
and j 6 ∨{j1,...,jk}. But then, by distributivity, there exists ji ∈ {j1,...,jk}
such that j 6 ji, whence by deﬁnition of AL, j = ji. Therefore, j 6 xj,a
contradiction. It follows that Fl does satisfy NASD. On the other hand, let
j ∈ AL,a n dx ∈ LAL such that j 6 xj. Then, by deﬁnition of Fl, j 6 F l(x)
and Fl also satisﬁes PASD.
Moreover, let F : LAL → L be a CIP that satisﬁes both NASD and PASD.
Then, for any j ∈ AL,a n dx ∈ LAL if j 6 F(x) then, by NASD, j 6 xj
hence j 6 F l(x). Therefore, F 6 F l (since L is atomistic). Conversely, for
any j ∈ AL,a n dx ∈ LAL if j 6 Fl(x) then there exist j1,...,jk ∈ AL such
that jh 6 xh, h =1 ,...,k,a n dj 6 ∨{j1,...,jk}. But then, by distributivity
6of L, there exists ji ∈ {j1,...,jk} such that j 6 ji, whence j = ji and j 6 xj.
It follows that j 6 F(x),b yP A S D .T h u s ,F 6 F l (since L is atomistic),
hence F = Fl.
ii) By contradiction: let us assume that L is a ﬁnite nondistributive atom-
istic lattice, and F : LAL → L a CIP which satisﬁes both NASD and PASD.
Since L is, in particular, nondistributive, there exist j ∈ JL = AL and
y1,...,yk ∈ L such that j ­ yh, h =1 ,...,k,a n dj 6 ∨{y1,...,yk}.M o r e o v e r ,
since L is atomistic there exist m ≥ k,a n dj1,...,jm ∈ AL\{j} such that
j 6 ∨{j1,...,jm}.N o w ,c o n s i d e r x ∈ LAL such that jh 6 xh, h =1 ,...,m,
and j ­ xj. Then, by NASD, j ­ F(x). However, by PASD, jh 6 F(x),
h =1 ,...,m, whence j 6 ∨{j1,...,jm} 6 F(x), a contradiction.
In particular, it is immediately checked that, by deﬁnition, j 6 xj entails
j 6 F l(x) i.e. F l satisﬁes PASD, hence it must violate NASD.
The foregoing facts suggest a ﬁrst, straightforward characterization of the
libertarian CIP in an arbitrary atomistic lattice, namely
Proposition 3 Let L =( L,6) be a (ﬁnite) atomistic lattice, and F : LAL →
L aC I P .T h e n ,F = F l if and only if F is the least inclusive CIP that satisﬁes
PASD.
Proof. We know already from the previous Claim that Fl does satisfy PASD.
Moreover, let F : LAL → L be a CIP that satisﬁes PASD. Then, for any
j ∈ AL and x ∈ LAL such that j 6 Fl(x),t h e r ee x i s tj1,...,j k ∈ AL such
that jh 6 xh, h =1 ,...,k,a n dj 6 ∨{j1,...,jk}.B y P A S D , jh 6 F(x),
h =1 ,...,k. Hence j 6 ∨{j1,...,jk} 6 F(x) i.e. F l 5 F as claimed.
Notice that, conversely, the most inclusive CIP that satisﬁes PASD is
the Universal Acceptance CIP F∨L which invariably selects an associative
structure comprising all agents as members5. Clearly, Universal Acceptance
is strictly more inclusive than Fl at any x ∈ LAL such that j ­ xj for some
j ∈ AL: hence the foregoing elementary characterization is tight.
It is immediately checked that, whenever L is distributive as well, Fl also
admits a dual characterization as the most inclusive CIP that satisﬁes NASD.
Of course, in view of the foregoing Claim, such a dual characterization of Fl
is bound to fail in the nondistributive case. Moreover, it has been already
noticed (see Claim i) above) that in the distributive case -as opposed to
5Thus, F∨L is deﬁned as follows: for any x ∈ LJL, F∨L(x)=∨L.
7the nondistributive one- Fl can also be characterized as the only CIP that
jointly satisﬁes PASD and NASD. But then, what about the possility to
lift the latter characterizations of Fl to arbitrary atomistic lattices by some
suitable generalization of NASD?6
It turns out that such a lifting is indeed feasible, thanks to the following
generalization of NASD.
Admission by Qualiﬁed Invitation (AQI) For any x ∈ LAL and any
j ∈ AL,i fj 6 F(x) then there exist j1,...,j k ∈ AL such that j 6 ∨{j1,...,jk}
and jh 6 xh ∧ F(x), h =1 ,...,k .
Notice that in the present setting relation j 6 ∨{j1,...,jk} may be inter-
preted as follows: ‘agent j is invited within the relevant associative structure
by agents j1,...,jk’; such an invitation amounts to an arbitrary combination
of explicit, formal certiﬁcations (when j 6 xjh, h ∈ {1,...,k}) and implicit,
tacit invitations (when j ­ xjh, h ∈ {1,...,k}) on the part of agents in
{j1,...,j k}.
Thus, AQI establishes that admission of an agent as member of the rel-
evant associative structure requires either a (possibly tacit) invitation or an
explicit certiﬁcation on the part of some self-certiﬁed member(s). In general,
NASD implies AQI while the converse implication does not hold. However,
AQI and NASD are equivalent whenever L is distributive, namely
Claim 4 i) Let L =( L,6) be a (ﬁnite) atomistic lattice, and F : LAL → L
aC I P .T h e n ,F satisﬁes NASD only if it also satisﬁes AQI. However, it may
be the case that F does satisfy AQI while violating NASD; ii) Let L =( L,6)
be a (ﬁnite) atomistic lattice. Then, L is distributive if and only if each CIP
F : LAL → L that satisﬁes AQI does also satisfy NASD.
Proof. i) Let F satisfy NASD. Therefore, if j ∈ AL and j 6 F(x) then it
m u s tb et h ec a s et h a tj 6 xj, hence AQI is satisﬁed (just take k =1 ,a n d
6To be sure, one might rather take the notion of a ‘most inclusive NASD-consistent
CIP’ as the starting point of the tentative deﬁnition of a new, dual libertarian rule
Fl∗
deﬁned pointwise by the least upper bound of the values of those CIPs that satisfy
NASD (if it exists). The main problem with this approach is that indeed the foregoing
least upper bound may not exist. Thus, such a ‘most inclusive NASD-consistent CIP’ (as
opposed to ‘one of many maximally inclusive NASD-consistent CIPs’) is typically not a
well-deﬁned notion in the nondistributive case. The details, however, need not detain us
here, and will be discussed elsewhere.
8j1 = j). Conversely, consider the Libertarian CIP Fl : Fl trivially satisﬁes
AQI, but fails to satisfy NASD (to check that, just consider the partition
lattice L =( Π({1,2,3}),v),i t sa t o m sπ12, π13, π23, and (with a slight abuse
of notation) opinion-proﬁle x =( x12,x 13,x 23) where x12 = π12, x13 = π13,
x23 = {{1},{2},{3}}.O f c o u r s e , π12 v Fl(x) and π13 v Fl(x).N o w ,
π12 ∨ π13 = {{1,2,3}} and π23 @ {{1,2,3}},w h e r e@ denotes of course the
asymmetric component of v.T h u s ,Fl(x)={{1,2,3}} whence π23 v Fl(x),
while not π23 v x23).
ii) Let L be a distributive lattice, F : LAL → L a CIP that satisﬁes AQI,
x ∈ LAL,a n dj ∈ AL.I f j 6 F(x) then, by AQI, there exists a set of
atoms {j1,...,jk} ⊆ AL such that jh 6 xh ∧F(x) for each h, h =1 ,...,k,a n d
j 6 ∨ {j1,...,jk}. But then, by distributivity of L (see Fact ii) above), there
exists jh ∈ {j1,...,jk} such that j 6 jh i.e. j = jh (by deﬁnition of atom).
Therefore, j 6 xj and NASD is satisﬁed, as claimed.
Conversely, suppose that for any CIP F : LAL → L,i fF satisﬁes AQI
then it also satisﬁes NASD. Then, consider F l: since it satisﬁes AQI, it does
also satisfy NASD i.e. for any j ∈ AL,a n da n yx ∈ LAL,i fj 6 F l(x)
then j 6 xj. Let us now assume that L is nondistributive: then, by Fact
ii) above, there exist j ∈ AL,x 1,...,xk ∈ L such that j<x 1 ∨ ... ∨ xk and
j ­ xh, h =1 ,...,k. Then, there exist j1,...,jm ∈ AL such that -for each
i ∈ {1,...,m}- ji 6 xh for some h ∈ {1,...,k},a n dj<j 1 ∨ ... ∨ jm. Clearly,
by construction, j ­ ji, i =1 ,...,m. Next, consider opinion-proﬁle x ∈ LAL
such that xjh = jh, h =1 ,...,m,a n dxi = ∧L for any i ∈ AL\{j1,...,jm}.
But then, j 6 j1 ∨ ... ∨ jm ,a n dj/ ∈ {j1,...,jm}, while by deﬁnition Fl(x)=
j1 ∨ ... ∨ jm. Hence, j 6 F l(x). It follows that -by NASD- j 6 xj,a
contradiction.
The next elementary characterizations of the Libertarian rule based upon
AQI conﬁrm that the latter is a suitable counterpart of NASD in the general
setting of arbitrary atomistic lattices.
Theorem 5 Let L =( L,6) be a (ﬁnite) atomistic lattice, and F : LAL →
L a CIP. Then, the following statements are equivalent: i)F is the most
inclusive CIP that satisﬁes AQI; ii) F satisﬁes both PASD and AQI; iii)
F = F l .
Proof. i)⇐⇒iii) Fl does satisfy AQI as shown above. Now, let F : LAL → L
be a CIP that satisﬁes AQI, and x ∈ LAL, j ∈ AL such that j 6 F(x).
9Then, by AQI, there exist j1,...,jk ∈ AL such that j 6 ∨{j1,...,jk} and
jh 6 xh ∧ F(x), h =1 ,...,k .H e n c e , b y d e ﬁnition of Fl, j 6 F l(x), i.e.
F 5 Fl as required.
ii) ⇒iii): Let F : LAL → L be a CIP that satisﬁes both PASD and AQI,
x ∈ LAL,a n dj ∈ AL.I fj 6 F(x) then by AQI there exist j1,...,jk ∈ AL such
that j 6 ∨{j1,...,jk} and jh 6 xh∧F(x), h =1 ,...,k .T h e r e f o r e ,j 6 Fl(x),
by deﬁnition of Fl.M o r e o v e r , i f j 6 F l(x) then there exist j1,...,jk ∈ AL
such that jh 6 xh, h =1 ,...,k,a n dj 6 ∨{j1,...,j k}.T h e r e f o r e ,b yP A S D ,
jh 6 F(x), h =1 ,...,k, hence j 6 ∨{j1,...,jk} 6 F(x).
iii)⇒ii): The Libertarian rule Fl clearly satisﬁes PASD (see the previous
Claim). F l also satisﬁes AQI: just consider that, for any j ∈ AL, x ∈ LAL
such that j 6 Fl(x) it must be the case that j ∈ AL .
Notice that the foregoing characterizations are tight, since there exist
CIPs which satisfy AQI and are strictly less inclusive than FL, while PASD
and AQI are mutually independent axioms. To check this, consider the Uni-
versal Acceptance CIP F∨L and the Universal Rejection CIP F∧L: F∨L satis-
ﬁes PASD but not AQI, while F∧L satisﬁes AQI but not PASD, and is clearly
less inclusive than Fl.
3 Non-manipulability of the Libertarian rule
in simple environments
Since CIPs are strategic game forms having opinions as strategies, it makes
sense to enquire about their manipulability or, more generally, their solv-
ability with respect to some suitable noncooperative or cooperative game-
theoretic solution concepts. We only need to specify the set of admissible
preferences over outcomes of each agent. Here I shall focus on a very sim-
ple set of admissible preference proﬁles, leaving a more general, full-ﬂedged
analysis as a topic for further research.
C o n s i d e rt h em o s te l e m e n t a r yc a s eo fs e l f-oriented preferences, where each
agent i ∈ N only cares about her own status with respect to association.
Then, in the basic case of (binary) identiﬁcation with exogenous labels agent
i will partition the outcome set L into two equivalence classes, namely the
two sets of best and worst outcomes, characterized by consistency with her
own preferred and dispreferred membership status, respectively. This case
10motivates the general notion of a simple environment as made precise by the
following
Deﬁnition 6 Let L =( L,6) be a ﬁnite atomistic lattice, AL the set of its
atoms, and x =( xj)j∈AL ∈ LAL.A n AL-proﬁle (<i)i∈AL of binary (prefer-
ence) relations on LAL is simple w.r.t. x -written (<i)i∈AL ∈ SAL(x)-i ﬀ for
any i ∈ AL,a n da n yy,z ∈ LAL: y <i z if and only if either [j 6 y and
j 6 xj] or [j ­ y and j ­ xj].T h esimple environment (on (L,A L))c o n s i s t s
of the set SAL = ∪x∈LALSAL(x) of all preference AL-proﬁles on LAL that are
simple w.r.t. some x ∈ LAL.
The signiﬁcance of the simple environment rests both on its remarkable
tractability and on the fact that it apparently leaves as little scope as pos-
sible for strategic manouvering and manipulation. The relevant notion of
(coalitional) non-manipulability or strategy-proofness is a straightforward
adaptation of the standard concept for voting mechanisms, namely
Deﬁnition 7 Let L =( L,6) be a ﬁnite atomistic lattice, and F : LAL → L
aC I P .F is coalitionally strategy-proof on the simple domain SAL iﬀ for any
x ∈ LAL, AL-proﬁle (<i)i∈AL ∈ SAL(x), S ⊆ AL, zN\S ∈ LN\S,a n dyS ∈ LS,
there exists i ∈ S such that
F(xS,z N\S) <i F(yS,z N\S) .
It turns out that at least on a very restricted domain such as the simple
environment, the Libertarian rule studied in this paper is indeed coalitionally
strategy-proof, no matter whether the underlying (ﬁnite, atomistic) lattice is
distributive or not:
Proposition 8 Let L =( L,6) be a ﬁnite atomistic lattice. Then the Lib-
ertarian CIP Fl : LAL → L is coalitionally strategy-proof on the simple
domain SAL.
Proof. Let L be an atomistic lattice, and AL = {j1,..,jk}. Then, consider
x =( xj)j∈AL ∈ LAL, (<i)i∈AL ∈ SAL(x).
Suppose there exist S ⊆ AL, yS ∈ LS and zN\S ∈ LN\S such that for each
i ∈ S
Fl(yS,z N\S) Âi Fl(xS,z N\S).
Then, by deﬁnition of SAL(x),i tm u s tb et h ec a s et h a tf o ra n yi ∈ S
either
11(i) i 6 xi , i ­ Fl(xS,z N\S) and i 6 F l(yS,z N\S)
or
(ii) i ­ xi , i 6 Fl(xS,z N\S) and i ­ Fl(yS,z N\S).
However, by deﬁnition of Fl, i 6 xi and i ∈ S entail i 6 F l(xS,z N\S) con-
tradicting (i). Hence, (ii) holds for each i ∈ S.N o w ,p o s i tu =( xS,z N\S):f o r
any i ∈ S,s i n c ei ­ xi and i 6 Fl(xS,z N\S),t h e r ee x i s t sJi = {j1,...,j ki} ⊆
AL such that jh 6 uh, h =1 ,...,ki,a n di 6 ∨{j1,...,jki},b yd e ﬁnition of
Fl. But then, for any such proﬁle (Ji)i∈S, S ∩ (∪i∈SJi)=∅ whence, for any
i ∈ S, i ­ xi and i 6 Fl(xS,z N\S) entail i 6 F l(yS,z N\S) for any i ∈ S,a
contradiction again.
Clearly, coalitional strategy-proofness of F l (on the simple domain) amounts
to saying that at any x ∈ LAL, x is a coalitionally dominant strategy equi-
librium7 o ft h eg a m ei ns t r a t e g i cf o r mG(F l,(<i (x))i∈AL): =( AL,L,(Li =
L)i∈AL,Fl,(<i (x))i∈AL). But notice that a coalitionally dominant strategy
equilibrium of a game is also a strong equilibrium and a fortiori a coalitional
equilibrium with threats8 of the same game.
Therefore, for any atomistic lattice the Libertarian rule enjoys both non-
cooperative and cooperative stability at least on the simple domain9.
7An AL-proﬁle y ∈ LAL is a coalitionally dominant strategy equilibrium of G(F, (<i
)i∈ALF) iﬀ for any T ⊆ AL, uN\T ∈ LN\T and zT ∈ LT there exists i ∈ T such that
F(yT,u N\T) <i F(zT,u N\T).
8An AL-proﬁle y ∈ LAL is a coalitional equilibrium with threats of G(F, (<i)i∈ALF) iﬀ
for any T ⊆ AL and zT ∈ LT there exists wN\T ∈ LN\T and i ∈ T such that
F(y) <i F(zT,w N\T).
Moreover, a coalitional equilibrium with threats y of G(F, (<i)i∈AL) is a strong equilib-
rium of G(F, (<i)i∈AL) iﬀ in particular for any T ⊆ AL and zT ∈ LT there exists i ∈ T
such that
F(y) <i F(zT,y N\T).
Of course, any strong equilibrium of F at (<i)i∈AL is a coalitional equilibrium with
threats of F at (<i)i∈AL, but not vice versa. Also notice that coalitional equilibrium with
threats is the strategic counterpart of the core,n a m e l ya n yl ∈ L is a core outcome of
G(F, (<i)i∈AL) iﬀ there exists a coalitional equilibrium with threats y of G(F, (<i)i∈AL)
such that l = F(y).
9A strategic game form G is solvable (or stable) with respect to a certain solution
concept on a certain domain D of preference proﬁles, if at each preference proﬁle < in D
the game (G,<) has a nonempty set of solutions.
124 Related literature
As mentioned in the Introduction, a few axiomatic characterizations of the
libertarian rule have been provided in the literature on collective identiﬁca-
tion with exogenous labels (both binary and nonbinary). In this section we
shall brieﬂy review them with a view to assess whether they can be lifted
into the general case of arbitrary atomistic lattices, in order to cover the case
of collective identiﬁcation with endogenous labelling. As it turns out, none of
the known characterizations of the libertarian CIP works within an arbitrary
atomistic lattice: in the process, we shall obtain generalizations of some of
the foregoing characterizations, showing that they hold if and only if the
underlying lattice of feasible associative structures is distributive.
Indeed, most known characterizations of the libertarian CIP for binary
classiﬁcation problems rest on the basic requirement that membership of
any agent should only depend on the assessment of her own credentials, as
established by the most straightforward adaptation of arrowian Independence
to collective identiﬁcation problems, namely
Independence (IND): For any x,x0 ∈ LAL and any j ∈ AL if [for all
i ∈ AL: j 6 xi iﬀ j 6 x0
i] then [j 6 F(x) iﬀ j 6 F(x0)].
Samet and Schmeidler (2003) provide two characterizations of the Lib-
ertarian rule as deﬁn e do nt h el a t t i c e(P(N),⊆), relying on Independence
and the ﬁrst three properties (the ﬁrst, the second and the fourth property,
respectively) of the following list:
Nondegeneracy (NDG):F o ra n yj ∈ AL there exist x,x0 ∈ LAL such
that j 6 F(x) and j ­ F(x0).
Clearly, Nondegeneracy is a mild requirement ensuring that for any agent
there exist both opinion proﬁles resulting in her inclusion in the associative
structure and opinion proﬁles mandating her exclusion from the latter. Thus,
Nondegeneracy rules out trivial constant rules and guarantees that each agent
may be or may be not part of the relevant association, depending on the
prevailing opinion proﬁle.
Monotonicity (MON):F o r a n y x,x0 ∈ LAL,i fxj 6 x0
j for each j ∈ AL
then F(x) 6 F(x0).
Monotonicity is also quite standard: it simply establishes that shifts to
opinion proﬁles acknowledging larger sets of qualiﬁed agents cannot result in
reduced memberships.
Collective Self-Determination (CSD): For any x,x0 ∈ LAL if [j 6 xi
iﬀ i 6 x0
j for any i,j ∈ AL] then F(x)=F(x0).
13Collective Self-Determination is a symmetry condition for members which
rules out cooptation practices: reversing the roles of ‘certiﬁers’ and ‘certiﬁed’
agents should not aﬀect membership.
Exclusivity of Self-Determination (ESD): For any x,x0 ∈ LAL and
any i,j ∈ AL if [((j 6 xi and j ­ x0
i) or (j ­ xi and j 6 x0
i)) iﬀ (i ­ F(x)
and j 6 F(x))] then F(x)=F(x0).
Thus, Exclusivity of Self-Determination decrees the irrelevance of the
opinion of non-members: changes in the opinion of the latter should not
aﬀect membership.
Notice that the Libertarian CIP satisﬁes NDG, MON, CSD and ESD in
any (ﬁnite) atomistic lattice, namely
Proposition 9 Let L =( L,6) be a ﬁnite atomistic lattice. Then the Liber-
tarian CIP F l : LAL → L does satisfy NDG, MON, CSD and ESD.
Proof. To see that Fl satisﬁes NDG just consider proﬁles x =( xj = ∨L)j∈AL
and y =( yj = ∧L)j∈AL: clearly, for any i ∈ AL, i 6 Fl(x) and i ­ Fl(y).
That Fl satisﬁes MON is also straightforward: if i 6 F l(x) and xj 6 x0
j for
any j ∈ AL then, in particular j 6 xj entails j 6 x0
j, hence, by deﬁnition of
Fl, i 6 Fl(x0) as well. Concerning CSD, notice that by deﬁnition of x and x0,
i 6 xi iﬀ i 6 x0
i. Therefore j 6 ∨{j1,...,jk} with {j1,...,jk} ⊆ {i : i 6 xi} iﬀ
j 6 ∨{j1,...,jk} with {j1,...,jk} ⊆ {i : i 6 x0
i} whence Fl(x)=Fl(x0).
Finally, for any x,x0 ∈ LAL and any i,j ∈ AL if [((j 6 xi and j ­ x0
i) or
(j ­ xi and j 6 x0
i)) iﬀ (i ­ Fl(x) and j 6 Fl(x))] then by deﬁnition of Fl it
must be the case that xi 6= x0
i entails i ­ xi hence in particular j 6 Fl(x)
entails j 6 Fl(x0). Conversely, j 6 F l(x0) entails j 6 ∨{j1,...,jk} with
{j1,...,j k} ⊆ {i : i 6 x0
i} hence, by deﬁnition of x0, {i : i 6 x0
i} ⊆ {i : i 6 xi}.
Therefore, j 6 Fl(x) as well. It follows that ESD is also satisﬁed by Fl.
However, it turns out that Independence is satisﬁed by the Libertarian
CIP Fl if L is distributive, but not in the general case, as made precise by
the following
Proposition 10 Let L =( L,6) be a ﬁnite atomistic lattice. Then the Lib-
ertarian CIP Fl : LAL → L satisﬁes IND iﬀ L is distributive.
Proof. Let L =( L,6) be a ﬁnite distributive atomistic lattice, j ∈ AL and
x,x0 ∈ LAL such that for all i ∈ AL, j 6 xi iﬀ j 6 x0
i.I fj 6 Fl(x) there must
14exist j1,...,jk ∈ AL such that jh 6 xh, h =1 ,...,k,a n dj 6 ∨{j1,...,j k}.B y
distributivity, there exists h ∈ {1,...,k} such that j 6 jh i.e. j = jh since
j ∈ AL. Therefore, j 6 xj hence, by assumption, j 6 x0
j: it follows that
j 6 F l(x0). By a similar argument it is easily checked that j 6 Fl(x0).T h u s
Fl does indeed satisfy IND.
Conversely, let us suppose that Fl satisﬁes IND. If L is not distributive
then, by Fact (ii) above there exist j ∈ AL and x1,...,xk ∈ L such that
jh ­ xh, h =1 ,...,k,a n dj 6 ∨{x1,...,xk}. Thus, again, there also exist
j1,...,jm ∈ AL such that -for each i ∈ {1,...,m}- ji 6 xh for some h ∈
{1,...,k},a n dj<j 1 ∨ ... ∨ jm. Clearly, by construction, j ­ ji, i =1 ,...,m.
Now, consider opinion-proﬁles x =( xi)i∈AL,x 0 =( x0
i)i∈AL ∈ LAL such
that xj = x0
j = ∧L while for any i ∈ AL\{j}, xi = ∧L and x0
i = i.
Clearly {i ∈ AL : j 6 xi}={i ∈ AL : j 6 x0
i}=∅ and j ­ Fl(x) but j 6 Fl(x0)
{i ∈ AL : j 6 xi}, so IND is violated: contradiction.
Thus, under the Libertarian CIP in an arbitrary atomistic lattice, the
assessment of the qualiﬁcation of any agent may well also depend on the
assessment of the qualiﬁcations of other agents10. As a consequence, we have
the following generalization of the characterization(s) of the Libertarian CIP
due to Samet and Schmeidler (2003).
Proposition 11 Let L =( L,6) be a ﬁnite atomistic lattice, and F : LAL →
L a CIP that satisﬁe s[ N D G ,M O N ,C S D ]o r[ N D G ,M O N ,E S D ].T h e n ,
the following statements are equivalent:
i) L is distributive; ii) If F satisﬁes IND then F = Fl.
Proof. i)=⇒ii) Suppose L is distributive. Then by a straightforward adap-
tation of the proof of Theorem 3 ( Theorem 4, respectively) of Samet and
Schmeidler (2003) to the case of a general distributive lattice, and by Propo-
sitions 9 and 10 above, Fl uniquely satisﬁes IND, NDG, MON, CSD (IND,
NDG, MON, ESD, respectively). Therefore, if F satisﬁes IND as well then
F = Fl.
ii)=⇒i) Suppose F does indeed satisfy IND. Then, by assumption, it must
be the case that F = Fl. Therefore, Fl does also satisfy IND. But then, by
Proposition 10 above, L is distributive.
10Incidentally, that is the central theme of Vannucci (2007).
15Another interesting characterization of the Libertarian CIP in the lattice
(P(N),⊆) - due to Kasher and Rubinstein (1997) and further reﬁned by
Sung and Dimitrov (2005)- relies on the following properties
Conditional Independence (CI):F o ra n yj ∈ AL and x,x0 ∈ LAL,i f
[i )i 6 F(x) iﬀ i 6 F(x0) for any i ∈ AL\{j},a n di i )j 6 xh iﬀ j 6 x0
h for
all h ∈ AL]t h e nj 6 F(x) iﬀ j 6 F(x0).
Thus, CI is a very weak version of Independence (see section 3 below): it
requires that membership of any agent should only depend on the assessment
of her qualiﬁcations and on assignment of memberships to other agents.11
Positive Opinion Responsiveness (POR):F o ra n yx ∈ LAL,i ft h e r e
exists j ∈ AL such that j 6 xj then there also exists i ∈ AL such that
i 6 F(x).
Clearly, POR requires that if some agent self-certiﬁes her qualiﬁcations
to join the given associative structure then at least one agent (not necessarily
the same) should be admitted into the latter. POR amounts to a generalized
version of the ‘positive’ part of the so-called ‘Liberal principle’ due to Kasher
and Rubinstein (1997)).
Negative Opinion Responsiveness (NOR):F o ra n yx ∈ LAL,i ft h e r e
exists j ∈ AL such that j ­ xj then there also exists i ∈ AL such that
i ­ F(x).
Hence, NOR is the ‘negative’ part of Kasher-Rubinstein’s ‘Liberal prin-
ciple’ saying that if some agent denies her own qualiﬁcations then the asso-
ciative structure should not include each agent.
Horizontal Symmetry (HS): For any i,j ∈ AL and x ∈ LAL, i 6 F(x)
iﬀ j 6 F(x) whenever [i) i 6 xi iﬀ j 6 xj, ii) i 6 xj iﬀ j 6 xi, iii) i 6 xh iﬀ
j 6 xh and h 6 xi iﬀ h 6 xj,f o ra n yh ∈ AL\{i,j}].
HS essentially requires equal treatment for any two agents whose qual-
iﬁcations are assessed identically by themselves and by all other agents: it
is a generalized version of the so called ‘Symmetry’ property introduced by
Kasher and Rubinstein (1997) (see also Sung and Dimitrov (2005)).
11CI is also an adaptation of a property introduced by Kasher and Rubinstein (1997)
under the misleading label ‘Independence’.
16As it happens, the Libertarian CIP Fl satisﬁes CI and POR in any atom-
istic lattice; however, NOR and HS are only satisﬁed by Fl when the under-
lying lattice is distributive, namely
Proposition 12 Let L =( L,6) be a ﬁnite atomistic lattice. Then, i)
Fl : LAL → L satisﬁes CI and POR; ii) if L is distributive then Fl : LAL → L
does satisfy HS; iii) Fl : LAL → L satisﬁes NOR iﬀ L is distributive.
Proof. i) Let j ∈ AL and x,x0 ∈ LAL,s u c ht h a t[i 6 Fl(x) iﬀ i 6 Fl(x0) for
any i ∈ AL\{j}]a n d[ j 6 xh iﬀ j 6 x0
h for all h ∈ AL]. Now, suppose j 6
Fl(x). Then, there exist j1,...,j k ∈ AL such that jh 6 xh, h =1 ,...,k,a n d
j 6 ∨{j1,...,jk}. Hence, by deﬁnition, jh 6 Fl(x), h =1 ,...,k, and therefore
jh 6 Fl(x0) for any jh ∈ {j1,...,j k}.I tf o l l o w st h a tj 6 ∨{j1,...,j k} 6 Fl(x0).
By a similar argument j 6 Fl(x0) entails j 6 Fl(x).T h u s ,F l satisﬁes CI.
Moreover, for any x ∈ LAL, if there exists j ∈ AL such that j 6 xj then
by deﬁnition j 6 Fl(x), hence POR is also satisﬁed by Fl.
ii) Suppose L is distributive, and let x ∈ LAL, i,j ∈ AL be such that a)
i 6 xi iﬀ j 6 xj,b )i 6 xj iﬀ j 6 xi,c )i 6 xh iﬀ j 6 xh and h 6 xi iﬀ
h 6 xj,f o ra n yh ∈ AL\{i,j}. Then, i 6 Fl(x) implies that there exist
j1,...,jk ∈ AL such that jh 6 xh, h =1 ,...,k,a n di 6 ∨{j1,...,jk}.B y
distributivity, there exists jh ∈ {j1,...,j k} such that i 6 jh hence indeed
i = jh. Therefore, i 6 xi, whence by assumption a) j 6 xj. It follows that
j 6 Fl(x) as well, as required by HS.
iii) Let us ﬁrst assume that Fl : LAL → L satisﬁes NOR and L is not
distributive. Then, by Fact (ii) above, there exist j ∈ AL and x1,...,x k ∈ L
such that jh ­ xh, h =1 ,...,k,a n dj 6 ∨{x1,...,x k}. Thus, again, there
also exist j1,...,jm ∈ AL such that -for each i ∈ {1,...,m}- ji 6 xh for
some h ∈ {1,...,k},a n dj<j 1 ∨ ... ∨ jm. Clearly, by construction, j ­ ji,
i =1 ,...,m.
Now, consider opinion-proﬁles x =( xi)i∈AL ∈ LAL such that xj = ∧L
while for any i ∈ AL\{j}, xi = ∨L. T h e ni np a r t i c u l a ri 6 Fl(x) for any
i ∈ AL (j included), while j ­ xj, which contradicts NOR. Conversely, if L
is distributive and x ∈ LALis such that there exists j ∈ AL with j ­ xj then
it can be shown that j ­ Fl(x). Indeed, suppose that j 6 Fl(x). Then, by
deﬁnition of Fl,t h e r ee x i s tj1,...,jk ∈ AL such that jh 6 xh, h =1 ,...,k,
and j 6 ∨{j1,...,jk}.S i n c e j ­ xj, j/ ∈ {j1,...,jk} for any such set, a
contradiction in view of Fact (ii) above and distributivity of L.
17Remark 13 Notice that if L is not distributive, then Fl may not satisfy
HS. To check this, consider the partition lattice L =( Π({1,2,3,4,5}),v),
and (with a slight abuse of notation) opinion-proﬁle x such that x12 = π12,
x13 = π13, xhk = {{1},{2},{3}} for any other atom (as indexed by hk). Of
course, not π23 v x23 and not π45 v x45 , not π23 v x45 and not π45 v x23,
and for any πhk ∈ AL\{π23,π45},b o t h[ not π23 v xhk and not π45 v xhk]a n d
[not πhk v x23 and not πhk v x45]. Nevertheless, since Fl(x)=π12 ∨ π13,i t
follows that π23 v Fl(x) while not π45 v Fl(x).
As a consequence of Proposition 11 we can establish the following gener-
alization of the characterization result for the Libertarian rule due to Kasher
and Rubinstein (1997), and Sung and Dimitrov (2005).
Proposition 14 Let L =( L,6) be a ﬁnite atomistic lattice, and F : LAL →
L a CIP that satisﬁes CI, POR and HS. Then, the following statements are
equivalent:
i) L is distributive; ii) If F satisﬁes NOR then F = Fl.
Proof. i)=⇒ii) Suppose L is distributive. Then by a straightforward adap-
tation of the proof of Theorem 2 of Sung and Dimitrov (2005) to the case
of a general distributive lattice, and by Proposition 12 above, Fl uniquely
satisﬁes CI, POR, NOR and HS. Therefore, if F satisﬁes NOR as well then
F = F l.
ii)=⇒i) Suppose F does indeed satisfy NOR. Then, by assumption, it
must be the case that F = Fl. Therefore, Fl does also satisfy NOR. But
then, by Proposition 12 above, L is distributive.
Remark 15 Other characterizations of the Libertarian Rule have been pro-
vided for the distributive case. In particular, Houy (2007) has a further char-
acterization of Fl that relies on Independence, while Miller (2006) provides
a characterization that rests on Join-Separability (i.e. for any x,y ∈ LAL,
F(x∨y)=F(x)∨F(y)) which again may be not satisﬁed by F l if the under-
lying lattice is nondistributive. Thus, it transpires that virtually all known
characterizations of the Libertarian Rule provided in the extant literature are
not suitable for the general (atomistic) case.
185C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
It has been shown that the Libertarian Identiﬁcation Rule Fl can be properly
deﬁn e di na n ya t o m i s t i cl a t t i c ea n dt h u sa p p l i e di nb o t hb i n a r yc l a s s i ﬁca-
tion models with exogenous intensional labels and in general classiﬁcation
problems with endogenous extensional labels. However, not all of the basic
properties of F l in the special (boolean) distributive case of binary classiﬁ-
cations can be safely lifted to that general atomistic environment. As a con-
sequence, only some of the known characterizations of the Libertarian Rule
can be adapted to the latter. By contrast, (coalitional) strategy-proofness
of Fl on simple domains turns out to hold for any ﬁnite atomistic lattice of
associative structures.
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